 |
| Dr. Nfor N. Susungi |
1. My attention was drawn to a recent interview by Hon. Ayah Paul Abine in which he stated that “there was no legal document on reunification”. This was further stated on his Facebook page. I am prompted to react because Hon Ayah Paul lends to this statement his status of a man of law. Any kind of clarification on reunification must be based on a dispassionate review of the facts (in the legal sense of the word). What are the facts as we know them?
2. The starting point for discovering what really happened on October 1, 1961 is to look at a document which was signed in Yaoundé by President Ahidjo and Prime Minister John Ngu Foncha on 14.10.60 innocuously entitled: Joint Communique. In this document, the Cameroun Republic, represented by President Ahmadou Ahidjo and Prime Minister Charles Assale and the British Southern Cameroons represented by John Ngu Foncha agreed on the terms and conditions for merging the two territories to form a federal union, in the event that the people of the British Southern Cameroons vote in favor of joining the Cameroun Republic in the UN plebiscite that was scheduled for February 11, 1961.
3. The term Joint Communique was a misnomer because, in reality, it was an agreement between two sovereign states as attested by signatories to the document.
4. The key question is whether the Joint Communique which Ahidjo, Assale and Foncha signed in Yaoundé on 14th October 1960 can be construed as a legally binding union agreement between the British Southern Cameroons and the French Cameroun Republic. The simple answer is that it was not intended to be that. It is now clear that it was merely a conditionalagreement which would only become operable in the event that the people of the British Southern Cameroons voted for the 2nd option in the plebiscite of 11th February 1961. If the people had voted for the 1st option of integration into the Nigerian Federation, the Joint Memorandum would automatically become useless.
5. We are told elsewhere that Foncha was keen on concluding a deal with Ahidjo simply because he needed a document which he can show the British Government during a future Conference in the UK that he was serious about pursuing the 2nd option with Ahidjo.
6. Foncha and the KNDP never really wanted to join Cameroun Republic. According to classified documents, it is Dr. Endeley who insisted that the 2nd option should be to join Cameroun Republic because he thought that the prospect would frighten people to vote to remain in Nigeria. Foncha’s party wanted total independence as the 2nd option; but this option was ruled out at the UN in 1959 when John Ngu Foncha, N.N Mbile, and Ndeh Ntumazah all testified before the UN 4th Committee in October 1959 that the British Southern Cameroons could not stand on its own.
7. The first problem with the Yaoundé Agreement (Joint Communique) was that although it was conditional on the outcome of the 11th February vote, it was nonetheless a document binding two states separated by internationally recognized borders. That automatically gave it the character of a treaty. However, the document was legally flawed because the Southern Cameroons government could not enter into such a “treaty” with a sovereign state (Cameroun Republic) without the authority of the UK, the Administering Authority. But once it was signed by Foncha against Ahidjo, who was the President of a sovereign state, it became difficult to rectify the mistake. It was not Ahidjo’s business to know whether Foncha had the power to sign “for and on behalf of the government of the Southern Cameroons” or not.
8. The second problem with the Yaoundé Agreement was that it spelled out the final boundaries of the federal union between the British Southern Cameroons and the French Cameroun Republic, even though the Opposition parties had not been involved in its negotiation. This was a violation of the guidelines which the British Ambassador stated to Ahidjo and Foncha during the first meeting held in Buea from 15-17 July 1960 in which he made it clear that theOpposition (CPNC) should be involved in final negotiations with the Cameroun Republic and final negotiations should be done between Her Majesty’s Government and the Cameroun Republic.
10. At the Lancaster House Conference of 1957, the Delegation for the Southern Cameroons governing party (KNC) consisted of: Dr. Endeley (Premier), John Takinang Ndze, HRH Fon Galega II, P.A Aiyuk and Victor Mukete (Adviser). Meanwhile the KNDP was represented by John Ngu Foncha and Augustine Ngom Jua (Adviser) and the KPP was represented by P.M Kale and N.N Mbile (Adviser). Mr JO Field and the British Government felt that, having participated at the 1957 Conference, Foncha and Jua would have understood that constitution making, in the Lancaster House tradition, must always be an all parties affair. Foncha, Muna, Jua, Kemcha and Effiom ignored this tradition and went on to sign a document which has since locked the Southern Cameroons into a weak position vis-à-vis the Cameroun Republic. But they came back from Yaoundé believing that they had done a fantastic job.
11. The catastrophic mistake which was committed by Commissioner JO
Field is that when Foncha, Muna, Jua and Kemcha took off for Yaoundé for the 3rd round of negotiations with President Ahidjo, the Commissioner did not expect them to succeed. The unexpected “success of Foncha’s delegation took the British Government and the Opposition by surprise and changed the course of Southern Cameroons history. The British Government initially took the agreement lightly because it was still believed that the 1st plebiscite option of joining Nigeria would prevail and render the Yaoundé Agreement caduque.
12. If the outcome of the plebiscite was that the people of the Southern Cameroons had voted for integration into Nigeria, the Yaoundé Agreement would have automatically become useless. However, when the outcome of the plebiscite favored reunion with Cameroun Republic, the Yaoundé Agreement (Joint Communique ) became a legally binding agreement between two states, whose terms and conditions had to be executed as required by UN General Assembly resolution 1608 (XV). But it was too late to expand the boundaries of that vague agreement.
13. Curiously the Administering authority simply went along with it and in so doing, the implicitly ratified the Yaoundé Agreement by acquiescence. The British Government still had full sovereign authority to step in and correct any deficiencies in the Yaoundé Agreement; but they did not do anything. It is at this stage that legal scholars can opine whether, having scaled through the obstacle of the plebiscite result, the Yaoundé Agreement had now been automatically transformed into a binding Union Agreement between the British Southern Cameroons and the Cameroun Republic. It is extremely difficult to argue that, under international law, this is not so.
14. Curiously when UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV) was tabled at the UN General Assembly, the Ahidjo government voted against it. The Southern Cameroons government could have used the negative vote of the Ahidjo Government against UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV) as grounds for repudiating the Yaoundé Agreement, whether it was considered as a binding union agreement or not. Legal conditions regarding contract repudiation are very clear.
15. If the Foncha government had done that in April 1961, they would have been totally justified and they could have demanded for a separate independence. The UN and the Administering Authority would have had no choice but to give them full support by postponing the termination of the trusteeship agreement over the Southern Cameroons. The Nigerian and British governments had voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 1608, clearing the way for integrating Northern Cameroons into Nigeria on 1st June 1961. Unfortunately the Foncha government failed to see this opportunity and it was lost for good.
16. When the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1608 in spite of Ahidjo’s NO vote, President Ahidjo changed tactics by making preparation for the Foumban Conference because the resolution required that the Cameroun Republic and the Southern Cameroon should agree by 1st October 1961 on how they were going to implement their “agreed policies”. Their agreed policies were contained in the Joint Communique of 14.10.1960.
17. President Ahidjo prepared a draft Federal Constitution and sent it to the Southern Cameroons Commissioner’s office in June 1961. The review of the draft showed that Ahidjo wanted to take over security from the states; he wanted to send security forces into Southern Cameroons and he wanted Foncha to hand over sovereignty to him. The Ahidjo who was wooed by Foncha in 1960 was now pushing to take over completely.
18. The Foumban Conference was held in July 1961 and the purpose was to discuss and agree on the draft federal constitution which Ahidjo had sent to Commissioner JO Field in June 1961. Many people have state that its purpose was to prepare a union agreement. This is simply not true because President Ahidjo prepared the draft federal constitution based on theJoint Communique of 14.10.1960.
19. The Foumban Conference of July 1961 was the only occasion where the opposition provided any input into the draft constitution because even after receiving the draft constitution from President Ahidjo, the KNDP government refused to share it with the CPNC opposition. At this stage it was too late because they were considered sore losers. After the Foumban Conference, President Ahidjo cut secret deals with Foncha and Muna by promising them positions in an expanded government and that is how the federal constitution was finalized after the Foumban Conference.
20. The Federal Constitution was tabled for adoption before the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly on 18.9.1961 under a motion by Honorable ST Muna, the Finance Minister. The motion was seconded by Motomby-Woleta, the Opposition spokesman.
21. After an eloquent speech in which he reiterated his belief that the people had made the wrong choice, he conceded, nevertheless, that the people’s choice must be supported in a democracy. That is how the Federal Constitution was adopted by the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly.
22. The adoption of the draft federal constitution by the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly on 18.9.61 marked the completion point of the implementation of UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV). The commonly held view that the UN resolution was not implemented is not supported by documentary evidence.
23. On 30th September 1961 at midnight, Commissioner JO Field and the British Battalion left Southern Cameroons; the security forces of the Cameroun Republic moved into the Southern Cameroons.
24. What are the implications under international law, of the fact that the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly adopted the draft Federal Constitution on 18.9.1961, clearing the way to the coming into effect of the Federal Republic of Cameroon and its constituent parts and organs from 1st October 1961? The first implication is that the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly had accepted that as from 1st October 1961, the Federal Constitution would become the supreme governing law over the combined territory of the British Southern Cameroons and Cameroun Republic, which thereafter, would be known as the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The second implication is that the Federal Constitution, which was unanimously adopted by the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, is indeed the legal document, binding the Cameroun Republic with the British Southern Cameroons.
25. It is the adoption of the federal constitution by the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly on 18.9.61 that automatically transferred sovereign powers over the Federal territory to President Ahidjo as from midnight on 30th September 1961 at midnight. Ahidjo, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the Cameroonian Armed Forces, had full powers to send the army into Bamenda, Kumba and Buea where a vacuum was created by the departure of the British Army Battalion.
26. As frustrations have grown over the years in the former British Southern Cameroons over feelings of second-class citizenship, over-centralization of power in Yaoundé, inadequate representation in government and structures of power, tokenism in official appointments, the unresponsiveness of the government in Yaoundé to many unresolved issues, there are temptations in the former British Southern Cameroons to accuse specific individuals for betraying them. It would be dangerous to single out specific individuals to assign exclusive blame to. Nevertheless specific instances of costly mistakes which brought about this situation need to be cited.
a. Southern Cameroonian leaders including Foncha, Mbile and Ntumazah sold the Southern Cameroons short at the 4th Committee of UN in October 959 when they all said that Southern Cameroons cannot stand on its own. Their self-proclaimed doubts to some extent, betrayedthe Southern Cameroons. They sounded like people who still needed spoon-feeding and babysitting. Guinea and Afghanistan who were also members of the UNGA 4th Committee said that economic viability did not matter on questions of sovereignty and independence.
b. Dr. Endeley sulked for too long after losing his Premiership to Foncha in 1959. He turned his back on Foncha and left the inexperienced KNDP government alone to handle the tricky negotiations with Ahidjo. He could have tabled a motion in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly demanding that the draft Federal Constitution sent by Ahidjo be opened to debate by the full house before going for negotiations in Foumban. But he did not. He could have stormed into the office of JO Field and demanded to see what was being negotiated behind the backs of the opposition. But he did not. Instead he insisted on the 2nd option of joining Cameroun Republic hoping that it will frighten people to vote in favor of Nigeria. Instead he drove Foncha into the arms of Ahidjo.
c. J O Field failed the people of the Southern Cameroons by allowing the Foncha government to hold three negotiating sessions with a foreign government (the Cameroun Republic) without the presence of a representative of the Administering Authority. This was a violation of the spirit of the Trusteeship Agreement of 1946. He failed to take any corrective action when Foncha came back from Yaoundé on 14 October 1960 with a signed treaty. It was the responsibility of the Administering Authority to hold final negotiations with the Cameroun Republic (like the UK did with China on behalf of Hong Kong). But J O Field failed in his job and did not even show up in Foumban as required by Resolution 1608 (XV). This was a further violation of the spirit of the Trusteeship Agreement. In a nutshell the United Kingdom abandoned its custodial responsibilities when it was needed the most.
d. Accusations have been made over the years against Foncha and Muna for betraying the people of the Southern Cameroons. However, an objective review of documents and the events leading up to the reunification shows that Foncha, Muna, Jua, Effiom and Kemchacan be charged with political naivety and incompetence due to lack of experience in their handling of key policies which were clearly beyond their depth; but the charge of betrayaldoes not stand up to scrutiny. Foncha, Muna and their KNDP allies were pro-independence by conviction. They had no desire for joining Cameroun Republic. It is Dr. Endeley who pushed them into the arms of Ahidjo by forcing the 2nd option of joining Cameroun Republic. They were however naïve when they went ahead and signed the Yaoundé Agreement of 14th October 1960 without consulting with the administering authority or with opposition parties.
e. Foncha could have initialed a draft agreement with Charles Assale (excluding Ahidjo) and brought it back to the Commissioner in Buea for further review. It is the Commissioner who would have taken it up with the Colonial Office in London to see how a more elaborate document could be crafted to represent the final agreed framework for unification if the 2ndoption prevails. If they had handled the Yaoundé agreement in this manner, H.M Government would have negotiated a document which would have better protected the people of the Southern Cameroons, in the same way that Hong Kong agreement with China protects Hong Kong today. Their decision to sign the document in Yaoundé without consulting anyone in Buea was an act of political naivety and incompetence not betrayal.
f. However, after receiving the draft federal constitution in June 1960, it is clear that Foncha and Muna were clearly influenced by the Federal positions promised to them by Ahidjo. This seems to have had a strong influence on their behavior before, during and after the Foumban Conference. Jua’s opposition to reunification may have been softened by the promise that he will become Prime Minister of West Cameroon after Foncha takes up the position of VP in Yaoundé. But in the end, Foncha kept the post of Prime Minister of West Cameroon after accepting the position of VP of the Federal Republic. Muna on the other hand accepted the position of Federal Minister of Post and Telecommunications on October 1st 1961 and his political career never took a dip till he retired from politics as President of the National Assembly.
g. The Foncha government failed to react when the Ahidjo Government voted against UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV) at the United Nations. Foncha could have immediately repudiated the Yaoundé Agreement and filed for full independence. Did Foncha’s government analyze the implications of President Ahidjo’s decision to vote against the UN resolution on reunification? This is a question that will never be answered.
27. Finally it would be incomplete to prepare a document of this nature without shedding some light on the role of President Ahidjo in the entire reunification process. Was he the Machiavellian villain that he is sometimes portrayed to be?
28. Documentary evidence seems to suggest that the constant preoccupation in the mind of President Ahidjo throughout the whole process was the threat of “communist terrorists” (marquisards) and the survival of his regime. Felix-Rolland Moumié had succeeded Reuben Um Nyobe as UPC leader after he was killed in 1958 in Sanaga Maritime. Having been previously implanted in Bassa country, the UPC marquis took for the mountains of Bamilike country and formed the Army for the Liberation of Kamerun (ALNK) under the command ofMartin Singap.
29. The following events took place during the reunification process:
a. The British Ambassador to Yaoundé indicated that Foncha and Moumié had met in Accra in early1960 and that Foncha was trying to convince Ahidjo to allow Moumié to return to Cameroun. Ahidjo was firmly opposed to this idea. This must have given Ahidjo some concern about the wisdom of coming too close to Foncha.
b. Dr. Moumié was poisoned in Geneva by French intelligence on 16th October 1960, two days following the signing of the Yaoundé Agreement. It is fair to assume that when Foncha and Ahidjo were meeting in Yaoundé, Ahidjo was already informed that French intelligence was planning to assassinate Moumié. He died in hospital on 3rd November 1960.
c. Ahidjo was aware of the fact that One Kamerun Party (OK) was a legally constituted party in the Southern Cameroons headed by Ndeh Ntumazah (a Mankon, Bamenda Man) and that OKP was a mirror of the UPC headed by Moumié the sworn enemy of Ahidjo. With Foncha (a Nkwen, Bamenda Man) who had been too friendly with Moumié (a Bamoum Man) and Endeley (a Bakweri Man) who was turning towards Nigeria, and the UN having forced Resolution 1608 (XV) down his throat, Ahidjo did not know who to count on as his friends. His regime was in deep trouble. He turned towards France and decided to play the anti-communist card to the fullest.
d. His French political advisers (Jacques Foccart) told him that in order to protect his regime, he must move military and security forces into Southern Cameroons at the same time that the British Protection Force is being withdrawn from the Southern Cameroons. Failure to do so would result in the ANLK, under the command of Martin Singap, moving their communist terrorists into Southern Cameroons where a vacuum would be created on the withdrawal of the British Protection Force. (Note that if this had happened, the counterinsurgency operation which President Ahidjo conducted in Bamilikeland between 1962-1966, with an armored brigade of the French Army under General Max Briand and Col Jean Lamberton, armed and supplied by Jacques Foccart, would have taken place in the West Cameroon)
e. Having secured Ahidjo’s agreement, French Commanders started planning with the Commander of the 1st Battalion of the Grenadier Guards on careful arrangement for the handover of their duties in Southern Cameroons to at least an equal number of troops from the Cameroun Republic, as they pull out on 30th September 1961. It is reported in a confidential document (COSS4/2188 X63970) dated November 1961 prepared by the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee on the Southern Cameroons that “the handover went in fact very smoothly. The Guards were withdrawn at the beginning of October and there have been no reports of any serious incidents since then”
f. The main reason why the British government arranged the handover to forces from Cameroun Republic is that HM Government decided to make a “parting gift” of £500,000, subsequently increased to £575,000 to the Southern Cameroons to pay the salaries of British officials staying beyond 1st October 1961. These British officials needed protection.
g. The above clarification is necessary in order to enable all Cameroonians to understand howand why security and armed forces of Cameroun Republic moved into the Southern Cameroons on reunification day. It is quite clear that President Ahidjo never negotiated in bad faith with Foncha and the Southern Cameroonians. He did not have any Machiavellian designs or agenda over the Southern Cameroons beyond the preoccupation to implement an unwanted and unsolicited UN resolution without jeopardizing the security of his regime.
30. In the light of all of the above, was the reunification of 1st October 1961 a legally valid sovereign merger under international law? Did the Federal Republic of Cameroon which came into being on 1st October 1961 meet all the conditions for being considered a properly constituted sovereign entity under international law? Was UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV) completely and satisfactorily implemented? The answer to all these questions, in my view, isYES because the process which I have examined does not contain any legal deficiencies or imperfections, under international law, which will lead me to question the constitutional validity of the sovereign entity which came into being on 1st October 1961 known as ‘The Federal Republic of Cameroon”.
31. In a nutshell, legal reunification did take place on 1st October 1961.
© Copyright July 2011, Nfor N. Susungi
No comments:
Post a Comment